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Introduction
Describing the status of member states in the European Union and understanding 
the implications of this membership on their national constitutional law is un­
doubtedly one of the challenges raised by the European integration process. The 
authors of a French constitutional law textbook considered – in a section devoted 
to the relativization of the contemporary state – that the state which has become 
a ‘community state’ is characterised ‘by the permeability of its legal order to rules 
issued by common institutions in which it is represented, but where it exercises, 
in common with the other member states, the powers conferred on these common 
institutions’.1 They then refer to the difficulty of ‘identifying, forming a theory 
of and constructing the new political model that is appropriate for this unprece­
dented aggregation of states. Which is taking reality ahead of a poorly suited vo­
* Professor at the University of Luxembourg. The author is grateful to Eleftheria Neframi and 
Nikos Scandamis for their precious comments on a draft version of this paper. 
1 See Vlad Constantinesco and Stéphane Pierré­Caps, Droit constitutionnel, 5 edn (PUF 2011), 
para. 332, p. 297.
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cabulary and inadequate descriptions, taken inevitably from the past.‘2 We shall 
use the sections below to attempt to make a contribution to this quest. 
To define this ‘unprecedented aggregation of states’ forming the European 
Union, it seems essential to improve the understanding of its implications on the 
status of the states it comprises. By joining the Union, these states effectively 
consent to substantial transfers of powers to Union institutions. In exchange, they 
receive rights of participation enabling what could be described as the common 
exercise of sovereign rights. The state becoming a member state also accepts, as 
such, numerous particular obligations, many of them arising from its general duty 
of sincere cooperation. In return, it is endowed with rights such as the right to 
have its identity respected by the Union, or at least as stated in Article 4, paragraph 
2 of the TEU, its national identity ‘inherent in [its] fundamental structures, po­
litical and constitutional’. However, this does not exclude these constitutional 
structures undergoing a certain transformation through the effect of the state 
joining the Union’s legal framework. 
Through joining the Union, the state doesn’t lose its statehood, but the latter 
changes in meaning.3 This transformation is not equivalent to that undergone 
by states, which decide to unite as federated states within a federation.4 Speaking 
relatively, it is, nonetheless, comparable thereto. In any case this transformation 
goes much further than what is usually meant by joining a classic international 
organisation. For this reason, it seems appropriate to designate the status of a state 
belonging to the European Union by using a term other than that – too com­
monly used – of ‘member state’. By reference to the process of European integra­
tion it seems preferable to speak of an ‘integrated state’.5
Despite the fact that the Union commits to respecting the constitutional iden­
tity of its member states, the substance, the spirit and the practice of these states’ 
constitutional law are being transformed under the influence of their belonging 
to the Union, to the extent that it is possible to detect a new branch of constitu­
tional law. We propose to call this ‘constitutional law of the integrated state’.6
2 Ibid., para. 333, p. 301.
3 On the situation of the State within the European Union see the inspiring thoughts of Nikos 
Skandamis, L’Etat dans l’Union européenne. Passion d’un grand acteur (RDP 2012), p. 1339 et seq.
4 In the sense given it by Olivier Beaud, Théorie de la fédération, 2nd edn (Paris, Coll. Lévia­
than, PUF 2009), 456 p.
5 A term also used by Jean­Denis Mouton, ‘Introduction: Présentation d’une proposition doc­
trinale’, in J­C. Barbato and J­D. Mouton (eds.), Towards Recognition of Fundamental Rights 
for the Member States of the European Union? Reflections on a Basis of Notions of Identity and 
Solidarity (Bruylant 2010), p. 16 and Hélène Gaudin, L’État vu de la Communauté et de l’Union 
européennes, ADE, vol. II (2004) (Brussels, Bruylant 2006), p. 249.
6 Thus, this terminology echoes what can be referred to in English as ‘member statehood’ and 
the German compound words Mitgliedstaatlichkeit and Mitgliedstaatsrecht.
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Union membership modifies the meaning of many important concepts of con­
stitutional law.7 This phenomenon of Europeanization can be observed in every 
member state, and has been particularly highlighted on the occasion of recent 
accessions. It appears even more obviously in a small founder state such as the 
Grand Duchy whose commitment to the process of European integration needs 
no further demonstration.8
The thesis defended hereafter implies a certain degree of ‘disciplinary mix’. 
Ordinarily, the discipline of constitutional law has to bear on the study and anal­
ysis of the rules, principles and institutions based on the constitution, be they 
directly dedicated to it or arising indirectly from it by virtue of statutes, of juris­
prudence, custom or institutional practice. If all constitutional law is not, therefore, 
confined to the constitution, it is, nevertheless, connected to it in one way or 
another. Thus, it is no surprise that European integration only made its entry – 
however modest – into the textbooks of constitutional law at the very moment, 
when member states started to constitutionalise their membership of the Com­
munities and the Union through specific ‘Europe clauses’. 
However, the true degree of Europeanization of a member state’s constitu­
tional law, making it possible in due course to talk of the emergence of a ‘consti­
tutional law of the Integrated State’, does not appear by looking only on explicit 
adaptations to its constitution. Europeanization takes several routes. The introduc­
tion of constitutional provisions enabling the transfer of powers, modifying the 
role of the national parliament in European affairs or derogating nationality con­
ditions that contravene the Union’s law are but the most obvious route. Europe­
anization also comes from the provisions of the Union’s law which themselves 
enrich constitutional matters by instituting new forms of political participation 
for the benefit of the organs or citizens of member states. One needs only think 
about the functions of national parliaments in monitoring compliance with sub­
sidiarity, or the possibility that citizens have of launching a European citizens’ 
initiative. Moreover, Europeanization arises from gradual, less obvious transforma­
tions that membership of the Union entails for the running of the state. The 
separation of powers is altered and the functions of state organs are enlarged. 
Similarly, the ‘right to trial before the lawful judge’, included in several constitu­
tions, must be considered by national judges as a constitutional foundation for 
7 Cf. in that regard for Poland, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, ‘Die Europäisierung am Beispiel der 
Verfassung Polens’, in E. Sileikis (Hrsg.), ‘Verfassungsentwicklung in Litauen Polen und der im 
Kontext Europäisierung’, 1 Development of Public Law (2010) p. 56, <www.devpublaw.eu/index.
php/dpl>.
8 A Eurobarometer survey of 2013 showed that at 87%, the ‘European sentiment’ of the popu­
lation of Luxembourg population is the highest in the Union.
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the obligation to refer for preliminary ruling at the Court of Justice and including, 
from this, the right of access to the Union’s courts.9 
After all, Europeanization may result in some point from treaty articles that fill 
up a lacuna at national level. This is the case, for instance, with the member states’ 
‘economic constitution’. Article 120, paragraph 2, TFEU provides indeed that ‘the 
Member States and the Union shall act in accordance with the principle of an 
open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of 
resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119’. As the 
Member States, with the exception of Germany, are actuality lacking economic 
constitutions, this provision, enjoying the primacy of Union law, establishes a 
regime which applies not only to the Union but also to each individual member 
state. Finally, a provision, such as Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Fiscal Compact 
(Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union; TSCG), requires the ratifying Eurozone states to enforce the so called 
‘golden rule’ of balanced budgets ‘through provisions of binding force and perma­
nent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully re­
spected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes’. Thus in the 
constitutional law of an ‘Integrated State’ one finds provisions arising from the 
Union’s law rubbing shoulders with provisions arising from constitutional law of 
national origin.
The thesis defended implies acceptance of the idea that the corpus of the mem­
ber state’s constitutional law – in its broad sense – now also includes elements 
originating in Europe. These rules, principles and institutions forming part of 
European law are usually studied in the Union’s law textbooks. The ‘disciplinary 
mixing’ will consist of including within the discipline of constitutional law the 
contributions of the Union’s law which, by their content, their objectives or their 
effects, complement, modify or otherwise affect items unquestionably arising from 
constitutional law in the material sense.
But one might well ask, ‘what is gained from doing this?’ What one gains is 
conceptual clarity. By accepting that there is now a certain osmosis through the 
membrane separating the spheres of the member state’s constitutional law and the 
Union’s law, we can better understand the changes in the former and, by the same 
token, the legal nature of the latter. 
To the extent that, like Germany and France, many member states have con­
stitutionalised their Union membership, there now exists an explicit constitu­
tional basis for it. This makes it possible to justify crossing the disciplinary frontier 
by European elements materially arising from constitutional law, even without 
9 Cf. in this sense the well­established case­law of the German Constitutional Court since the 
Solange II ruling of 22 Oct. 1986 (BVerfGE 73,339), later confirmed by rulings of 8 April 1987 
(BVerfGE 75,223) and 31 May 1990 (BVerfGE 82,159).
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formally doing so. The absence of a European clause in Luxembourg has not 
prevented this phenomenon happening here. Moreover, the inclusion of such a 
clause is now on the agenda.
The Europeanization of constitutional law has already been the subject of many 
scholarly papers.10 This phenomenon occurs with the greatest impact when a new 
state joins and has to make all the associated constitutional adaptations in the 
course of the prior negotiations.11 It has led to the appearance of a branch of 
‘European constitutional law’, understood here as an ensemble of laws within the 
constitutional law of a member state having to do with European integration and, 
more specifically, with the State’s membership of the Union. This is what the Ger­
man language doctrine calls nationales Europaverfassungsrecht.12
Paraphrasing the words of Vlad Constantinesco on the permeability of the 
member state’s national legislation,13 it is noted that its constitutional law becomes 
permeable to the influence of the Union’s law.14 The Europeanization of member 
states’ constitutional laws does not stop with the introduction of a ‘Europe article’ 
and various other ‘reconciliations’ in legal texts.15 Membership of the Union 
brings with it a much deeper transformation of the member state’s constitutional 
law.
It is impossible to give a full account here of every aspect and every variation 
of the Europeanization of internal constitutional law observable in the different 
member states. That task would demand the publication of an entire collection of 
books dedicated in each member state to what is termed in the German language 
10 See, in particular, Jacques Ziller (ed.), L’européanisation des droits constitutionnels à la lumière 
de la Constitution pour l’Europe (Paris, L’Harmattan 2003), 336 p., Monica Claes, ‘The Europe­
anization of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalization of Europe: Some Observations 
against the Background of the Constitutional Expérience of the EU­15’, Croation Yearbook of Euro-
pean Law and Policy (2007), p. 1­38. 
11 Lastly, for matters concerning the accession of Croatia, see Irena Andrassy, ‘Constitutional 
Implications of EU Membership: An Overview of Constitutional Issues in the Negotiating Process 
– The Croatian Perspective’, in 4 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2008) p. 224­247 
and Frank Hoffmeister, ‘Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View from the Com­
mission’, 3 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2007) p. 59­98.
12 Cf. also Christoph Grabenwarter, ‘Staatliches Unionsverfassungsrecht’, in A. von Bogdandy 
and J. Bast (eds.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2nd edn (Berlin 2009), p. 121­175.
13 Supra, n. 2.
14 On this phenomenon, see Mattias Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht 
(Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2011), 764 p.
15 Cf. the reflections of Genoveva Vrabie, ‘L’européanisation du droit constitutionnel roumain 
après l’adhésion de l’État à l’Union européenne’, 20 Bulletin Stiintific Universitatea ‘Mihail Kogal-
niceanu’ (2011) p. 1­7. Faced with the way in which some constitutions have been complemented 
(not to say ‘reconciled’), the author is wondering about the usefulness of developing ‘a model of 
fundamental law’ able to inspire national constitution drafters and reflecting a new philosophy 
from the (specific) content of the Constitution in the Union’s member states.
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Mitglied-Staatsrecht. More modestly, an attempt will be made to explain the notion 
of constitutional law of one Integrated State by showing, using some examples, 
how membership of the Union affects and transforms some principles, institutions, 
powers and rules of Luxembourg’s constitutional law.
The constitutional implications of EU membership can be subdivided by fol­
lowing the principal objects of any constitution. The constitution refers firstly to 
the state, in this case, the state that has become a member state (1). Secondly, it 
determines the separation of powers among constitutional organs that also assume 
European roles (2). Thirdly, it provides for the protection of rights and liberties, 
which must be integrated into the European space of fundamental rights (3); and 
it constitutes the basis of a legal system which opens itself to the Union’s law (4).
The ‘independent’ nation state is transformed into a member 
state
Article One of the Constitution of 1868, currently in force, states among other 
matters that the Grand Duchy is an ‘independent’ state, a statement that appeared 
in the same place in the previous constitutional texts of 1848 and 1856. These 
latter constitutions, however, very clearly put this independence into perspective 
by going on to state that it was ‘part of the German Confederation’. The 1856 text 
went even further by stating that it ‘participates in the rights and obligations aris­
ing from the Federal Constitution. These rights and these obligation cannot be 
derogated by the internal legislation of the country’. 
Be it a matter of the past tense of the German Confederation or the present 
tense of European integration, the constitutional proclamation of independence 
has never stopped the Grand Duchy from participating in integration exercises 
with a constitutional dimension. Moreover, at no time has the preservation of the 
independence of the State ever been seriously discussed as a possible limit to Lux­
embourg’s participation in the European integration process.16 
Its successive incorporation in the German Confederation (1815­1866), the 
‘Zollverein’ (1842­1918), the Belgo­Luxembourg Economic Union (from 1921) 
and Benelux (from 1944) have, on the contrary, enabled it to acquire the experi­
ence indispensable for being prepared for the legal implications of its membership 
of the European Communities and Union.
It is well known that the Treaty of Rome of 2004 establishing a European 
Constitution had formalised the elements constituting the status of the member 
state. Thus, it contained clauses relating to Union membership defining eligibil­
16 Cf. Georges Wivenes, ‘Le droit européen et les constitutions nationales. Luxembourg report’, 
in Lord Slynn of Hadley and M. Andenas (eds.), FIDE XX. Congress, vol. 1 (London 2002), p. 267 
et seq.
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ity criteria (Article I­58), suspension of membership rights (Article I­59) and 
voluntary withdrawal (Article I­60). It also defined the relationship between the 
Union and member states (Article I­5) and articulated the principle of solidarity 
between the Union and its member states (Article I­43). The Treaty on European 
Union has essentially maintained these elements. The status of the member state 
is, consequently, a combination of provisions governing Union membership and 
defining the rights and obligations arising therefrom.17
There can be no doubt that it is Article 4 of the TEU, which covers the funda­
mental elements of the status of the ‘Integrated State’. This provision indeed 
marries the duty of the Union to respect the national identities of its member 
states with their obligations arising from the duty of sincere cooperation.18 It 
involves respect for the essential functions of the state, including the monopoly 
of coercion, its right of withdrawal and its competence­competence principle. It 
also safeguards the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the duty of sincerity 
which ‘expresses an obligation inherent to member status’.19 
The condition of being a member state of the Union now constitutes a separate 
legal status, a sort of particular statehood (‘Mitglied­Staatlichkeit’ or ‘member 
statehood’) which differs from that of an independent nation state.20 The very 
particular nature of this member statehood even allows considering the idea of 
member states holding fundamental rights that the Union has a duty to respect.21 
Four types of state consequently exist: independent states, member states of an 
international organisation or confederation, Union Integrated States and feder­
ated states.
Because of the constitutional implications, several member states have gone on 
to constitutionalise their Union membership. For now, Luxembourg has been 
17 On the French case cf. Béligh Nabli, L’exercice des fonctions d’État membre de la Communauté 
européenne. Étude de la participation des organes étatiques à la production et à l’exécution du droit 
communautaire. Le cas français, vol. 63 (Paris, Dalloz, Collection Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses 
2007), 670 p.
18 Mouton, supra, n. 5, p. 16.
19 Cf. Eleftheria Neframi, L’État membre au service de l’Union européenne, vol. II (ADE 2004), 
p. 72­73.
20 Cf. Christopher J. Bickerton, European Integration, From Nation-States to Member States (Ox­
ford University Press 2012), 217 p., esp. p. 52 ff, where he evokes the idea of ‘Member Statehood 
as legal title’.
21 In favor of this idea see Jean­Denis Mouton, Introduction: Présentation d’une proposition doc-
trinale, in Barbato and Mouton, supra n. 5, p. 16 et seq. The ECJ recently decided that, as the 
‘European Union is a union based on the rule of law, its institutions being subject to review of the 
conformity of their acts, inter alia, with the Treaty and the general principles of law’, new Member 
states ‘must enjoy, in relation to all measures which […] affect them in their capacity as Member 
States, a right of action as applicants pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 230 EC. Hence 
Member States can rely on the principle of effective judicial protection. ECJ, Case C­336/09 P, 
Poland v. Commission, 26 June 2012, points 36­38.
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content to have a very general clause allowing the temporary devolution to ‘inter­
national institutions’ of the exercise of powers, reserved by the Constitution to the 
three powers of the State.22 As part of the current overhaul, though, it is envisaged 
to provide in a new Article 5 that the Grand Duchy ‘participates in the European 
Union’ and that ‘the exercise of the State’s powers may be transferred to the Eu­
ropean Union [...] by an act passed by qualified majority’.23 Integrated State 
status will then be anchored in the Union’s law and constitutional law. We can 
only regret that it is not in Article One that it is intended to write this European 
clause, as was the case in the past with membership of the German Confederation.
Taking as our starting point the fact that international law defines the sovereign 
state as being delimited by established territorial boundaries, inside which its laws 
apply to a permanent population and its organs exercise effective authority, one 
could ask to what extent the elements of this definition are affected by Union 
membership.
Insofar as the resident population is concerned, Luxembourg, it will be noted, 
is in a particular position. More than 38% of its 537,000 residents are, in fact 
nationals of other EU member states and 55% are of Luxembourg nationality. 
Added to this are 160,000 frontier workers, who work in Luxembourg while resid­
ing in neighbouring countries.24 This situation leads politicians to consider open­
ing the right to vote in parliamentary elections up to residents.25 The relationship 
between the concepts of citizenship and nationality is, thus, evolving not only 
under the influence of Union citizenship, which is in addition to national citizen­
ship, but also under the demographic pressure of European citizens exercising their 
right to free movement. Unless the right to vote in parliamentary elections is 
opened up, the representative legitimacy of the Chamber of Deputies is at risk of 
dwindling.
This particular demographic situation had been recognized by the protocol on 
the Grand­Duchy of Luxembourg joint to the treaty of Rome in 1957. Its Article 
2 provided: ‘When framing the regulations on freedom of movement for workers 
provided for in Article 48 (3) of this Treaty, the Commission shall take account, 
as regards the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, of the special demographic situation 
in that country.’26 Brought forward in Case C­473/93, Commission v. Luxembourg, 
22 Art. 49bis of the Constitution introduced by a revision of 1956.
23 Cf. the Opinion of the Council of State of 6 June 2012, Annex 2, with juxtaposed texts of 
the current Constitution, the proposed revision and the Opinion, available at <www.conseil­État.
public.lu>.
24 Figures published by the statistical agency for 2013, <www.statec.lu>.
25 Cf. contributions to issue 326 of the magazine ‘forum’ Citoyenneté et droit de vote, February 
2013, p. 20­51, <www.forum.lu>.
26 The Protocol was abrogated in the course of the simplification of the Community treaties 
realized by the Amsterdam Treaty of 2 Oct. 1997 (Art. 6(III)(1)(d)).
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the argument did not, however, convince. The Court considered that Luxembourg 
could not be allowed on that basis ‘to unilaterally exclude workers from other 
Member States from entire areas of occupational activity’.27
Let us not forget that beyond the demographic context, all Union citizens resid­
ing in Luxembourg are granted political rights. Some of them, such as the right 
to petition the European Parliament, the right to vote at European and municipal 
level and the right to participate in a European Citizens’ Initiative, are recognised 
directly through the Union’s law and in this way complement rights that the 
Constitution, in principle, reserved solely for nationals. Regarding the exercise of 
political rights by ‘non­Luxembourgers’ (Article 9) and their eligibility for public 
office (Article 10bis, para. 2), the Constitution was modified to a minimum extent 
in 1994 and 1999 to allow a legal waiver and, thus, comply with the Union’s law.28
On these two points, the pending constitutional revision aims to go further, 
by particularly explicitly safeguarding the political rights of Union citizens (new 
Article 10 para. 2). In the Luxembourg population, the classic division between 
nationals and foreigners is, therefore, gradually being replaced by a more nuanced 
distinction between nationals, Union citizens and third country nationals.
With regard to the relationship between the state and its territory, a certain 
change can be noted here also. Admittedly, as Francette Fines reminds us, states 
‘are not dispossessed of their territory’, but they have accepted ‘that their territory 
also serves as the territorial framework for action by Community institutions, 
which are thereby granted Community territory’.29
On the concept of sovereignty, one is tempted to doubt its explanatory value 
for the situation of Integrated Union States. Admittedly, one could legitimately 
remain attached to this notion and defend the position that in the Union sover­
eignty resides with States.30 But does that grasp all the originality of the situation 
of these member states? Is it not preferable to consider, like Carl Schmitt, that in 
a federation the question of sovereignty is, so to speak, ‘suspended’?31
27 ECJ, 2 July 1996, Commission v. Luxembourg, C­473/93, ECR I­3207, point 45. Cp. point 
35: ‘considerations relating to the preservation of national identity in a demographic situation as 
specific as that prevailing in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg’ cannot justify exclusion of nationals 
of other Member States from all the posts in an area such as education’.
28 The real opening of Luxembourg’s public service results from the law of 18 Dec. 2009 and a 
Grand Duchy Regulation of 12 May 2010 which lists the employments that ‘involve direct or in­
direct participation in the exercise of public power’ and which are, therefore, reserved for nationals. 
29 Francette Fines, ‘Quel territoire pour les États membres de la Communauté européenne dans 
un espace sans frontières intérieures?’, 2 ADE (2004), p. 9­30, esp. p. 30.
30 As does Dieter Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung II: Auswirkungen von Europäisierung und 
Globalisierung (Berlin, Suhrkamp Verlag 2012), 357 p. and Souveränität: Herkunft und Zukunft 
eines Schlüsselbegriffs (Berlin 2009), 140 p.
31 Carl Schmitt, ‘Verfassungslehre des Bundes’, in Verfassungslehre, 8th edn (Berlin, Duncker & 
Humblot 1993), p. 361 ff, p. 372.
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Regarding the external aspect of sovereignty, account must always be taken of 
the fact that the international relations of Integrated States in the Union will be 
subject to duties of action and abstention flowing from the duty of sincere coop­
eration which ‘is of general application’ and depends neither on the exclusive 
nature or not of the Union in question’s competence ‘nor on any possible right on 
the part of the member states to enter into obligations towards third countries’. 
Thus, Luxembourg accepts an obligation of close cooperation towards the Union’s 
institutions in such a way as to facilitate the accomplishment of the Union’s mis­
sion and to ‘guarantee the unity and coherence of action and international repre­
sentation’ by and for the Union.32
The constitutional organs of Luxembourg take on European 
functions
In Luxembourg, as in other member states, the constitution organises the separa­
tion of powers and the distribution of competences among the organs it institutes. 
Through belonging to the Union, these constitutional organs also have European 
functions conferred on them to varying extents. Their European functions, there­
fore, are in addition to their constitutional functions, leading to a kind of ‘func­
tional doubling’ of each organ involved, without this being reflected in the text of 
the 1868 Constitution.33
Regarding executive power and, firstly, the head of state, it will be noted, none­
theless, that the Grand Duke may not represent Luxembourg in the European 
Council. He does not meet the condition, in use by Article 10 of the TEU since 
the Lisbon Treaty came into force, of being ‘democratically accountable’ either to 
the Chamber of Deputies or to the citizens of Luxembourg.34 One could even 
ask oneself how it is possible to reconcile the hereditary nature of his function with 
the Union’s constitutional system, which makes the equality of all citizens a central 
principle.35 Luc Heuschling demonstrated, moreover, that behind the body of 
the monarch is the citizen, able to demands rights on this basis.36 In any event, 
32 Case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805, points 58-60.
33 On what she calls ‘national projections in European institutions’, see the Simone Beissel’s 
very comprehensive overview, ‘Luxembourg’, in J. Rideau (ed.), Les Etats membres de l’Union eu-
ropéenne. Adaptations, Mutations, Résistances (Paris, LGDJ 1997), p. 337­366, p. 348 et seq.
34 Cf. Jan­Herman Reestman, ‘The State of the European Union’s Monarchies. An Introduc­
tion to the Series’, EuConst (2011) p. 270.
35 Cf. Wim Roobol, ‘Twilight of the European Monarchy’, EuConst (2011) p. 286.
36 Luc Heuschling, Le citoyen monarque. Réflexions sur le Grand-Duc, la famille grand-ducale et 
le droit de vote (Brussels, Larcier 2013), 296 p.
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Union membership of a constitutional monarchy does not come without creating 
frictions which could adversely affect its constitutional law.37 
Regarding the Grand Duchy’s Government, its European function essentially 
consists of representing Luxembourg in the Council, which as we know exercises 
‘jointly with the European Parliament, legislative and budgetary functions’. Mem­
bers of the Luxembourg Government exercising their right to vote there pursuant 
to TEU, Article 16, paragraph 2, are also participating at the Union level in func­
tions which, internally, are reserved to the legislative power. Membership of the 
Union is reflected in a considerable expansion of the functions assigned to mem­
bers of the government, without this being reflected in the Luxembourg Constitu­
tion.
Concerning the legislative power and, therefore, the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies, it is noted that its participation in European affairs has also developed 
outside of the Constitution. Its ‘European function’ is no less real for all that.38 
Under the new Article 12 of the TEU, national parliaments are, in effect, called 
upon to actively contribute to the good functioning of the Union, including ‘by 
seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in accordance with the 
procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality’.39 The scrutiny they exercise in this regard on 
compliance with subsidiarity criteria can be connected both to their role of con­
trolling national executives and to their participation in the exercise of European 
legislative power. Once again, membership of the Union brings with it the expan­
sion of the powers of a constitutional organ.
At the level of the judiciary, the 1868 Constitution is limited to setting out the 
general framework for the organisation of justice. The individual must, neverthe­
less, read this Chapter VI of the Constitution in the light of the provisions of the 
TEU and the TFEU to understand that he or she has access, limited but real, to 
the Court of Justice. Within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution, which 
states that ‘no­one may be reassigned against his will to a court other than that 
designated by law’, the Court of Justice must be considered a ‘legal court’ for the 
purposes of internal constitutional law. This raises the ultimate question of wheth­
er the obligation of the Luxembourg court to make a reference for preliminary 
ruling to the ECJ may, where appropriate, be sanctioned by domestic law. The 
37 See Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira’s reflections, ‘The EU and Its Monarchies: Influences 
and Frictions’, EuConst (2012) p. 63­81.
38 Cf. Martina Mayer, Die Europafunktion der nationalen Parlamente in der Europäischen Un-
ion (Mohr Siebeck 2012), 613 p. Patrick Dumont and Astrid Spreitzer, ‘The Europeanization of 
Domestic Legislation in Luxembourg’, in S. Brouard et al. (eds.), The Europeanization of Domestic 
Legislatures, The Empirical Implications of the Delors’ Myth in Nine Countries (2012), p. 131­149.
39 Cf. on this point, Martin Gennart, Le contrôle parlementaire du principe de subsidiarité. Droit 
belge, néerlandais et luxembourgeois (Brussels, Larcier 2013), 363 p.
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only remedy available under Luxembourg law would then be to introduce an ac­
tion for liability against the State.40 Speaking generally, the statistics show that 
Luxembourg’s courts, which do not seem to experience any great difficulty in ap­
plying and interpreting the Union’s law, are among those sending the lowest num­
ber of referrals for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.41
To conclude: the organs of the Integrated State assume henceforward some 
functions in the interest of the Union. The separation of powers is then modified 
at the national level. One example of this is the fact that the Grand Duke’s pre­
rogative to appoint magistrates is put to one side by the law of the Union. Mem­
bers of the Court of Justice are indeed appointed by common accord of the 
governments of member states. The Government of Luxembourg, therefore, is 
exercising in this area a power that the Constitution internally reserves to the Head 
of State.
If membership of the Union affects the separation of powers in the member 
state, it also entails its special responsibility to ensure the democratic legitimacy 
of the Union. The political accountability of Luxembourg members of the Euro­
pean Council and the Council of Ministers is, in fact, to the Chamber of Deputies, 
which actively participates in the management of European affairs.42 In the same 
vein, we must not forget that the election of Members of the European Parliament 
also takes place to some extent in accordance with national rules.
One final consequence of the attributions of European functions to constitu­
tional organs or to their members is the appearance of ‘European’ and ‘crossed’ 
incompatibilities coming to be added to the regime of incompatibilities defined 
by the Constitution. In Luxembourg law, the list of incompatibilities with the 
mandate to be a deputy, appearing in Article 54 of the Constitution, was comple­
mented by the electoral law on the basis of Article 55 of the Constitution, under 
which ‘the incompatibilities provided for under the preceding article do not pres­
ent any obstacle to the law establishing others in future’. A bill of 2 May 2013 
finally aims to incorporate into it the rule – which has always been respected in 
40 Cf. Georges Ravarani, Rapport luxembourgeois au Colloque des Conseils d’État du Benelux, 
10 Oct. 2013, La transposition et la mise en œuvre des actes normatifs de l’Union européenne en droit 
national, <www.conseil­État.public.lu/fr/actualites/2013/10/C_Colloque_Benelux/index.html>.
41 In the fifty years from 1963 to October 2013, 87 preliminary rulings were introduced by 
Luxembourg courts. Cf. also Jean­Paul Hoffmann, ‘Les questions préjudicielles posées par les ju­
ridictions luxembourgeoises à la CJCE’, in Mélanges F. Schockweiler, II Bulletin du Cercle F. Lau-
rent (Luxembourg 1998), p. 5­79; and Manou Weirich, ‘L’application du droit communautaire au 
Grand­Duché de Luxembourg’, in Livre jubilaire de la Conférence Saint-Yves (Luxembourg, Saint 
Paul 1986), p. 965­1004, p. 982.
42 The rules of such participation are set down in annex 2 of the Rules of the Chamber, ‘Aide­
mémoire on cooperation between the Chamber of Deputies and the Government of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg in European politics’, cf. coordinated text updated on July 31, 2013 Text, 
A Mémorial [Official Journal of Luxembourg] No. 172 of 20 Sept. 2013, p. 3295 et seq.
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practice – of prohibiting anyone holding office as both a deputy in the Chamber 
of Deputies and a member of the European Parliament.43 This incompatibility 
results, in fact, from the Act of 20 September 1976 as amended by a decision of 
the Council of 25 June and 23 September 2002, concerning the election by direct 
universal suffrage of representatives to the European Parliament.
The new Article 7(2), first subparagraph, of the Act lays down that as from the 
2004 election, being a member of the European Parliament is incompatible with 
being a member of a national parliament. Thus, the Luxembourg regime of par­
liamentary incompatibilities is currently the result of a combination of constitu­
tional, legal and European provisions. As part of the pending revision of the 
Constitution, it is planned to include this rule in a new Article 66 laying down 
that ‘the mandate to be a deputy is incompatible with the functions of being a 
member of the Government, being a member of the European Parliament and 
being a member of the Council of State’. Other incompatibilities clearly arise from 
the appointment of Luxembourg nationals as members of other Union institutions, 
be they the Court of Justice, the Commission, the European Central Bank or the 
Court of Auditors.44
The protection of fundamental rights is guaranteed in the 
European area 
In Europe, the protection of fundamental rights is no longer the prerogative of 
national constitutions and declarations. For the Union and its member states, the 
relevant legal sources are now listed in Article 6 of the TEU. The State of Luxem­
bourg must, therefore, respect not only the rights and liberties guaranteed in 
Chapter 2 of its Constitution but also those enshrined in the European Conven­
tion of Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as those 
enshrined as general principles of the Union’s law.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has been mandatory for the 
Grand Duchy since 3 September 1953.45 It can certainly be said with no exag­
geration that in view of the age and incomplete nature of the constitutional cata­
logue, it is the primary source of fundamental rights in Luxembourg.46 With 
regard to Article 6 guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, the High Court of Justice 
rightly points out that ‘directly applicable and of higher value than domestic law’, 
this article constitutes ‘the reference text with regard to the guarantee of the rights 
43 Cf. Bill No. 6571 (2 May 2013) amending the amended electoral law of 18 Feb. 2003.
44 Former minister François Biltgen was careful to resign from the government even before 
accepting its decision to propose him as a Luxembourg judge at the Court of Justice.
45 By virtue of its ratification by the law of 29 Aug. 1953.
46 Cf. Wivenes, supra n. 16, p. 17.
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of persons before a court’.47 Given the profusion of rights guaranteed at the Eu­
ropean and international levels, the present author once raised the question wheth­
er constitutional protection has not become superfluous.48
In the ‘European area of fundamental rights’,49 characterised by the overlaying 
of legal sources and a complex regime of jurisdictional competences, the protection 
of rights raises difficult issues of coordination. 
With regard to the ECHR it is well known that the principle of its subsidiar­
ity solves most of these problems. Although the Convention does not place an 
obligation on participating states to question the authority of res judicata of a 
domestic court ruling declared incompatible with the Convention by the Euro­
pean Court, Luxembourg has, nonetheless, introduced into its domestic legislation 
a procedure for the revision of such decisions. Article 443 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure has, since 1981, provided a fifth ground for opening an application for 
revision, when it is the result of a ruling of the European Court made in applica­
tion of the ECHR ‘that a criminal conviction has been handed down in violation 
of this Convention’.50 
With regard to the Charter, it is the strict definition of its scope of application 
in Article 51 that is supposed to reduce any problems arising from the coexistence 
of national and European protections for human rights. After the Court of Justice’s 
resounding rulings in the Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson cases of 26 February 2013, 
it is nevertheless clear that the Court does not intend to limit itself to a restrictive 
interpretation of the Charter’s scope of application. Therefore, member states must 
respect the rights of the Charter when ‘acting in the scope of Union law’ and not 
only when they ‘implement’ it. Moreover, when implementing Union law, they 
may only apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights on condi­
tion that ‘that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted 
by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are 
not thereby compromised’.51 One could bet that the consequence of this juris­
prudence would be to reduce even more the recourse of litigants and their legal 
representatives to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It 
47 See the joint opinion of the High Court of Justice [...] on the proposed revision modifying 
and reordering the Constitution, doc. parl. No. 60304, p. 7.
48 Cf. Jörg Gerkrath, ‘La proposition de révision dans le contexte international: la garantie 
constitutionnelle des droits fondamentaux serait­elle devenue superflue  ? Quelques remarques à 
propos de la notion des droits fondamentaux, de leur formulation et de leur protection’, in Institut 
Grand­Ducal, Actes de la Section des sciences morales et politiques (2011) p. 197­219.
49 Expression borrowed from Viviane Reding, address of 18 Feb. 2010 in Interlaken, ‘Towards 
a European Area of Fundamental Rights: The EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Accession 
to the European Convention of Human Rights’, Speech/10/33.
50 Law of 30 April 1981 on the revision of criminal and correctional trials and the compensa­
tion awarded to the victims of miscarriages of justice.
51 ECJ, 26 Feb. 2013, Stefano Melloni, Case C­399/11, para. 60.
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also has the effect of reducing the role of the Luxembourg Constitutional Court 
in the protection of fundamental rights, and in this way of changing the attribu­
tion of powers desired by the drafters of the constitution.52 It is too early to have 
an idea about the fate that the courts of Luxembourg reserve for the Charter 
rights.53 As part of the proposed general overhaul of the Constitution, it was 
nevertheless envisaged at an early stage to restructure Chapter 2 of the Constitu­
tion, following the model of the titles used in the Charter.54
Luxembourg’s legal order opens up to European Union law
One of the particular characteristics of Luxembourg’s domestic legal order lies in 
the fact that, unlike other European countries, it is founded on international law. 
Established as an independent state by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 
9 June 1815, the Grand Duchy’s independence was confirmed by the Treaties of 
London of 19 April 1839 and 11 May 1867. Therefore, far from constituting a 
threat to national sovereignty, international law is understood in Luxembourg as 
a ‘vital guarantee of the existence and survival of the state’.55 Moreover, Luxem­
bourg’s courts have had no difficulty in recognising the pre­eminence of interna­
tional law and the primacy of Community Law, including in respect of a 
constitutional provision.56 This state of affairs also explains why it was not con­
sidered necessary to write a provision into the Constitution more explicitly au­
thorising transfers of competences to the Union.
Under Luxembourg law the Constitution long ago ceased to be the only supreme 
law.57 There is now a set of norms ranked supra­legislative and designated by the 
term ‘higher law’. It is within the remit of the Council of State to monitor the 
52 For the relevant case­law of the Constitutional Court, cf. Mark D. Cole, ‘Der Schutz der 
Grundrechte’, in J. Gerkrath (ed.), La jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle du Luxembourg. 
1997-2007, 1­2 Pasicrisie (2008) p. 59 et seq.
53 Cf. Giulia F. Jaeger, Rapport Luxembourg, The Protection of Fundamental Rights after Lis­
bon: The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
ECHR and National Constitutions, XXV FIDE Congress, Tallin 2012, <www.fide2012.eu>.
54 Cf. draft revision of 21 April 2009, Parl. Doc. No. 6030. In the last version of the Parlia­
mentary Constitutional Revision Commission’s working document, it returned to a subdivision 
according to the nature of the rights guaranteed.
55 Wivenes, supra n. 16, p. 6.
56 Cf. Pierre Pescatore, ‘L’autorité en droit interne, des traites internationaux’, Pasicrisie Lux-
embourgeoise (1962) p. 97 ff, Wivenes, supra n. 16, p. 21, Patrick Kinsch, ‘Le rôle du droit interna­
tional dans l’ordre juridique luxembourgeois’, 1­2 Pasicrisie (2010) p. 383­399.
57 At the time of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, some lambasted the suspension of the 
Constitution occurring in that ratification of the Treaty took place before the constitutional revi­
sion allowing citizens of the Union the right to vote in communal elections. Cf. Alex Bonn, ‘La 
Constitution suspendue’, 24 Letzebuerger Land, 12 June 1992.
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compliance of draft bills and draft regulations with the rules of higher law. The 
amended act of 12 July 1996, reforming the Council of State, states in its Article 
2, paragraph 2, that ‘if it considers a draft bill to be contrary to the Constitution, 
to international agreements and treaties, or to the general principles of law, the 
Council of State shall state this in its Opinion. It shall do the same, if it considers 
a draft regulation to be contrary to a rule of higher law.’ As part of the revision 
procedure on track, it is planned to state this ex ante check on compliance with 
‘higher law’ in Article 91, explicitly including within it the ‘legally binding deci­
sions of the European Union’. It is also intended to state in Article 99 that ‘courts 
shall only apply acts and regulations to the extent that they comply with rules of 
higher law’. 
If the Constitution is, therefore, challenged in its role of supreme law, parlia­
mentary acts also lose some of their importance in national legislation because of 
the perceived need to streamline the procedures for the transposition and imple­
mentation of secondary EU legislation. Insofar as ever more important sections 
of national legislation are directly conditioned by Union law and legislators face 
often very short deadlines for the transposition of directives, the Luxembourg 
Parliament has adopted an Enabling Act conferring on the regulatory power the 
competence to proceed.58 
This law is, however limited in scope and has not really proven an ‘appropriate 
and effective response’ to the problems encountered.59 The inclusion in the Con­
stitution of a new Article 45, planned as part of the current overhaul, stating that 
the Head of State ‘shall make the necessary regulations for the application of le­
gally binding decisions of the European Union’ will have the advantage of eradicat­
ing a number of legal uncertainties in this area. Membership of the Union also 
brings alterations to the domestic legal order in which the initial relationship 
between constitutional, legislative and regulatory norms is modified to the detri­
ment of the first two of these categories.
The thesis of the emergence of a new type of constitutional law, that of the 
Integrated State, requires deeper analysis than that made in this contribution. 
There is, however, no doubt that European integration is exercising a determining 
influence not only on institutions but also on the concepts of member states’ 
constitutional law. And the fact is, these member states are members of what one 
58 Law (as amended) of 9 Aug. 1971 ‘on the execution and sanctioning of decisions and direc­
tives and the sanctioning of regulations of the European Communities in the economic, technical, 
agricultural, forestry, social and transport spheres’.
59 Paul Schmit, Rapport du Conseil d’État, Colloque des Conseils d’État du Benelux, 10 octobre 
2013, La transposition et la mise en œuvre des actes normatifs de l’Union européenne en droit natio nal, 
<www.conseil­État.public.lu/fr/actualites/2013/10/C_Colloque_Benelux/index.html>, p. 5; cf. 
Weirich, supra n. 41, p. 966.
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could call a ‘Union of Constitutionally Integrated States’. The entanglement of 
the Union’s constitutional law with that of its member states is such that tradi­
tional frontiers are becoming fluid. 
q
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